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Abstact
Tulisan ini berisi review kebijakan ekonomi pemerintahserta observasi masalah imple-
mentasi dan institusionalyang muncul dart kebijakan tersebutyang diduga merupakan salah
satu penyebab utama krisis ekonomi yang bersumberdari kesalahan manajemen kebijakan
ekonomi makro.
Kebijakan perekonomianyang berorientasipada ekspor, koordinasi terpusat atas dktivi-
tas produksi, jaminan pemerintah atas investasi swasta serta hubungan erat antara perusa-
haan dan sektor perbankan merupakan kunci kesuksesan ekonomi Indonesia di masa lalu.
Tetapi kelemahan pada institusi keuangan dan regulasinya, terutama sejak liberasalisasi
sektor keuangan dan perbankan yang diawali oleh Pakto 1988 telah membawa instabilitas
perekonomian dan berlanjutdenganketerpurukan ekonomi Indonesia. Ketergantungan yang
tinggipada hutang luar negeri serta dominasi aliran modaljangka pendek terutamayang
terjadi sejak tahun 1990-1994 dalam sector bisnis swasta merupakan salah satu alasan
utama yang menjelaskan penyebab terjadinya krisis moneter tahun 1997.
INTRODUCTION
The case of Indonesian economic crisis
has been very surprising to many peoples,
especially economist. Not many economists
could readily understand the case oflndone-
sian downturn. Macroeconomic indicators
have been very convincing and give a very
promising future. Many experts believe that
Indonesia would become a middle class of
newly industrial country in the early 21th
century. However, things change instantly,
and all the scenarios have to be rewrite. Its
started in 1997, when the contagious twin
crises in currency and banking spread' rap
idly from Thailand to other Asian countries,
including Indonesia.
Financial systems in East Asia generally
share a history of financial repression, which
included limits on interest rates and entry
and obligatory lending to policy preferred
sectors and projects. Of the three types of fi
nancial regulation, economic, prudential,
and information, financial repression relies
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on economic regulation and tends to neglect
the tools of prudential regulations such as
capital requirement and limits on risky in
vestment and the tools of information regu
lation such as disclosure requirement {White
1995a, p.6).
However, unlike other country in Asia,
Indonesian economic crises brought a lot
larger damage to the country and remains
for a relatively longer period. It also expanse
to the non-economic issues, such as social
crisis and political tuming point. Moreover,
the crisis has brought the Indonesia's most
powerful leader Suharto withdraw from his
presidency. This largest economic turbu
lence in the history of Indonesia since 1945,
has brought a lot of changes in social and
economic structure of the country. How
ever, it also brings a number of lessons to
Indonesian people.
Indonesian economic has experienced
several stages of economic and industrial
growth during the "New Order" regime.
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since 1969. During the period of 1969-
1996, the gross domestic product (GDP) of
Indonesia increased at the average rate
nearly 7 percent per year. Also there has
been a sharp reduction in the incidence and
severity of poverty and significant im
provements in a range of other social indica
tors. The number of people in poor house
holds has been reduced significantly from 70
percent of the total population in 1967 to
only 13 percent in 1996.
After the period of economic and politi
cal stabilization, between 1966 to 1969, the
"New Order" Government of Indonesia,
started to improve the Indonesia's economic
performance through several stages of de
velopment plans and programs. From this
point, the Indonesia's success stories began.
During the early years, ie. 1973 - 1981, GDP
growth averaged about 7 percent per annum,
which is comparable to other High Perform
ing East Asian Countries (HPEACs). This
rapid economic growth was associated with
the improvement of the countries' term-of-
trade, especially from oil export. From 1973
to 1982, oil and mineral exports were re
sponsible for the success story of Indonesian
economy. During the period, the trade re
gime was import substitution and inward-
looking oriented. The Government used
their high earning from oil to speed up the
industrialization process through extensive
public investment in upstream-capital inten
sive, industry, such as cement and fertilizer.
During the next stages, however, ie. be
tween 1982 - 1985, GDP growth slowed
down to about 4 percent. It was because of
the collapse of oil prices in the world mar
ket, which mounted the Indonesian balance
of payment difficulties. As stated before,
during most of the 1970s and into the early
1980s, Indonesia's economy depended heav
ily on the country's oil and gas industries. In
1981 about 70 percent of both government
and total export revenues came from the oil
and gas industries. These industries also ac
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counted for over 25 percent of the country's
total gross domestic product (JRosu/, 1998).
Such pressure on external factors convinced
the Government of Indonesia the limitation
of oil export as the engine of growth. There
was an urgency of shifting the engine of
growth from oil export to non-oil manufac
turing exports. This policy shift also
brought the consequence of shifting the
trade regime from inward-looking to export-
led-growth oriented.
And, from 1986 to the present, the in
dustrial policies have been attributed by de
regulation and reforms and improvement of
the role of non-oil sector and private sector
industries. The purpose of this policy is to
sustain the past rapid economic growth by
shifting the engine of the economy from
natural-resources based industry, to manu
facturing industry, and more modem sectors,
where the private sector has the bigger role.
This paper will review sequentially
what and how the GOI go. about its macro-
economic policies in responding the dy
namic economic problem. This paper will
also observe the institutional and implemen
tation problem arise from each of the GOI
economic policies, which is considered as
one of the main problem of the Indonesia's
macroeconomic management, leading to the
economic crisis in the past.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
PERFORMANCE
The Period of 1945-1966/1967
During this period, the Government of
Indonesia (GOI) allocated most of the coun
try's resources to political activities. Prob
lems on international affairs and national in
tegrity forced the govemment not to put
economic development on top priority. It re
sulted in underdeveloped economic stmc-
ture and stagnant structural transformation.
In 1951, agricultural sector contributed 55.5
percent to gross domestic product (GDP)
and 51.5 percent in 1964 whereas manufac-
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turing sector contributed 8.4 percent in 1951
and 8.2 percent in 1966. Meanwhile, per
capita income growth was also stagnant
since economic growth was offset by an
equal rate of population growth (Sjahrir,
1992; Abimanyu, 1988).
By the end of the period (1966), the In
donesian economy was collapsed because of
the imbalance of monetary and fiscal poli
cies. Government expenditures was increas
ingly financed by money creation rather than
taxation, foreign debt or other type of debt-
financed. As a result, the economy was
characterized by hyperinflation, deteriorat
ing balance of payments and decreasing
production of all kinds ofgoods.
Economic Stabilization: 1966-1973/1974
The above situation did not change until
the emergence of the new leader (New Or
der) in 1966. New Order government
brought an immense change in politics and
economy. The new regime reversed the po
litical and economic priority of the previous
regime. Since 1966 the New Order govern
ment established a new strong National
Government by placing political stability as
a foundation for economic development.
From 1966 to 1973, the government in
troduced several economic rehabilitation and
stabilization program by implementing fi
nancial and industrial policies toward more
liberal economies. The new government re
established financial link with Western
economies by utilizing foreign fund such as
loan, grants and foreign direct investment.
The old regime was reluctant to have finan
cial link with industrial countries. It con
ducted policies such as self -reliance cam
paign, nationalization of foreign companies
and default on debt service payments.
Political and economic policies con
ducted by the new govemment were able to
solve the problems of large govemment
budget deficit and slow economic growth.
IMF's initial assistance to govemment pro
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gram and budget during August and Sep
tember 1966 was able to start up the eco
nomic engine. In 1965, the budget deficit
was nearly 7 percent of GDP and in 1966,
this ratio was still over 5 percent, but in
1967, the ratio was reduced to 0.3 percent.
Indeed, the budget deficit and the associated
rate of inflation-induced money creation
were reduced significantly.
The New Order govemment started to
conduct planned economic development
called Five Year Economic Development
Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun
or Repelita). The First Plan (Repelita I) be
gan in 1969/1970 and ended in 1973/1974.
The main aims of Repelita I were to stabi
lized the economic system through a reform
of monetary and fiscal policies, to rehabili
tate strategic economic sector damaged by
the previous govemment policy and to
establish substantial rate of growth of per
capita income. The period under Repelita I
known as the period of "stabilization, reha
bilitation and development."
To finance its development ejforts for
Repelita, the Government of Indonesia
(GOI) was heavily dependent on foreign
funds. About 59 per cent of its development
expenditure was financed byforeign aid, 14
per cent by private capital infiows, with the
govemment saving and domestic private
saving accounting for only 16 and 11 per
cent respectively ofthe development budgets
(Azis, 1994).
The development emphasis ofRepelita I
was on agriculture (especially rice) produc
tion. Aside from agriculture development,
under Repelita I, the GOI also concem with
the development of necessity, such as cloth
ing manufacture, improvement in infrastruc
ture and housing, expansion of employment,
and expansion of natural resources and
manufacturing industry. A.bout 30 per cent
of the development budget was allocated to
the agricultural sector where it was use
mainly for rehabilitation ofagriculture inffa-
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stmcftire, such as irrigation facilities. All
these initiatives were basically intended to
give the farmers greater opportunity for eco
nomic self-improvement. {Firdausy. I99S).
During this period, economic growth
was targeted at 5 percent annually. In fact,
economic growth reached 8.6 percent annu
ally. This impressive economic growth was
partly due to the fact that Indonesia was still
in the transition period of development. In
the transition period, investment needs a
relatively low figure on Incremental Capital
Output Ratio (IGOR). For a densely popu
lated country like Indonesia, basic needs are
strategic factors for economic stability.
Therefore, in the First and Second Plan, the
national economic development programs
were focused on building strong agricultural
sector, especially foods. The target of these
two Plans was to achieve self-sufficiency in
food production.
Oil Boom: 1973/1974 - 1981/1982
The OPEC's decision to increase oil
price in 1973 and 1978 have directly topped
Indonesian oil price. In the beginning of
1969, Indonesian oil price was only 1.67
US$ per barrel but in November 1973, it
reached 6 US$ per barrel, and in July 1974,
it reached 12.60 US$ and topped at 35 US$
in January 1981. The increase of oil price
raised domestic revenues and government
saving. In the period of oil boom, instead of
reducing foreign debt or increasing the debt
service payment, Indonesia continuously in
creased the amount of foreign debt. In 1973,
oil export revenues increasedby 210 percent
(from US$ 1680.7 billion to US$ 5211.4 in
1974). At the same time, Indonesia's for
eign debt also increased by 111.9 percent
from the previous fiscal year. The momen
tum to reduce the debt burden was beatenby
the momentum to pursue economic growth.
The government priority was to build an ex
tensive public investment on capital inten
sive, resources based industry such as fertil
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izer, petrochemical and cement. These in
dustries were strongly protected by the gov
ernment since the decision makers in in
vestment conducted import substitution and
inward looking strategy. Besides, mostplay
ers in the protected industries are State-
owned Enterprise (BUMN). Investment in
capital intensive industries is expected to
support self-sufficiency in food production
program and other basic needs (for example,
housing) for the majority of Indonesianpeo
ple, and also to accelerate the pace of indus
trialization in Indonesia.
During this period, oil and gas revenues
contribution to domestic revenues increased..
In 1973/1974, oil and gas sector contributed
39.5 percent to domestic revenues, while in
1981/1982, it contributed 70i6 percent. Dur
ing oil boom period, the economy grew at
7.94 percent annually. This oil bonanza to a
large extent has changed the appearance of
the second Repelita (1974/75 - 1978/79).
Under the second Repelita, the GOI give
greater attention on the aspect of social wel
fare and general aspect of economic devel
opment, while maintain economic stability
in place and less focus on economicgrowth.
During these years the governmentspending
allocated more to the education and health
services, while reduce the allocation of re
sources to agriculture, industry and mining
development. New allocation categories
such as trade and cooperatives, manpower
and transmigration and regional develop
ment appeared in Repelita II. These new
categories appear in the Repelita II, were
also influenced by the social unrest in Janu
ary 1974, locally known as Malari 1974,
which specifically concern about equity is
sues of the economic development. Greater
emphasis was placed on obtaining a more
equitable distribution of income, greater
employment opportunities and "non eco
nomic" goals.
Equity issues were taken even more se
riously in Repelita III. In Repelita III, the
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development objectives were an equitable
distribution of development activities to
produce widespread social justice (equity),
•high rate of economic growth and a sound,
dynamic state of national stability. These
three interrelated development goals were
locally known as "trilogi pembangunan."
(Firdausy, 1995). This period of oil boom
has also changed the GOI political perform
ance. Strong financial support from oil reve
nue on one hand and low target of Repelita
II and III on the other hand, has greaten the
tendency of the GOI to spend money
through his non-budgeted government ex
penditure system, known as "strategic ex
penditures". Since the system is not trans
parent, this "strategic (non-budgeted) ex
penditures", in the future, become the
important post for civil servant's corruption.
Sluggish Economic Growth and Transi
tion of Financing from Oil to Manufac
turing Sector: 1982-1985
So far, the current account balance was
dominated by surplus from oil export reve
nue, leaving non-oil sector export relatively
small and unchanged. However, in 1982, the
international oil price sharply declined. As a
result, Indonesia faced balance of payment
difficulties and sluggish economic growth.
The Indonesian current account deficit in
1982/1983 reached USS 7.2 billion (7.7 per
cent of GDP). Economy only grew at 4 per
cent a year. Sluggish economic growth con
tinued until 1985 when the government
started to conduct industrial deregulation
and reforms. To overcome these problems,
the GOI used both fiscal and monetary poli
cies simultaneously. GOI utilized resources
mobilization improvement program through
comprehensive financial and fiscal reforma
tion, improved efficiency in custom, port
and shipping. Meanwhile, public expendi
tures were cut significantly by rephasing
many large projects and cutbacks in budget
ary subsidies. Expenditures cut included.
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Civil service employment and salaries were
restrained.
To reduce the current account deficit,
various import license were increased sig
nificantly during 1983-1986 period. At the
same time, monetary policy was conducted
to improve Indonesia's competitiveness on
non-oil export. In March 1983, the GOI de
valued Rupiah by 28 percent. This policy is
followed by managing the exchange rate
more flexibly. Unfortunately, the monetary
and fiscal policies conducted by GOI were
inconsistent with policies on trade and in
dustrial sectors. Trade and industrial policies
became even more inward oriented and
more strongly intervened (Pangestu, 1993).
In general, the industrial structure dur
ing this period did not yet very much rely on
the role of private sector and market mecha
nism. Most of business actors were playing
inefficiently. Rigid State-owned Enterprise
played a major role. Monetary and fiscal
policies did not work effectively since the
real sector had no ability to capture business
opportunities due to more liberal policies.
Moreover, the policies led to even a larger
current account deficit and higher Debt Ser
vice Ratio (DSR).
The Deregulation Period: 1985-Now
In 1986, another sharp decline in oil
price and continued degeneration in primary
commodity price resulted in an even worse
situation for Indonesia's term of trade. The
DSR jumped from 26 percent in 1985 to 37
percent in 1986. To overcome these prob
lems, the GOI, again, devalued Rupiah. The
difference from the previous devaluation
was that the 1986 devaluation was accom
panied by consistent and supportive trade
and industrial measures. Trade and industrial
policies were purposed to promote non-oil
investment and exports by reducing trade
barriers and other institutional regulations
which led to a high cost economy.
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Since 1985, serial deregulation and re
forms have been conducted in order to re
move several handicap in promoting export.
Such deregulation were conducted to change
the direction of trade policy away from the
previous trade regime, which was char
acterized by inward-looking with high and
variable effective rate of protection for im
portable and negative rate for exportable.
Although these deregulation series give a
very promising future for Indonesian manu
facture industry, there were so many prob
lems in the implementation level. Removing
tariff and trade barrier involve so many
changes in business culture of government
and private enterprises.
Deregulation package in October 1986
eliminated import licensing for 197 items
accounted for 19 percent of import value. It
was the beginning of a series of deregulation
and reformation program conducted by the
GOI to limit the role of inefficient bureauc
racy and to promote the role of efficient pri
vate sector in the economy. Overall trade
and industrial policies were shifted from in
ward and import substitution oriented to
outward and export promotion oriented.
There were at least three types of meas
ures conducted by the GOI to broaden and
deepen the deregulation and reformation
process:
Table 1.
Structural Change(%of GDP)
• To reduce non-tariff barriers and the
level of tariff protection. These reforms
were supported by a series of deregula
tion in infrastructure services, such as
maritime sectors and custom services.
• To relax license requirements and for
eign investment restrictions. These
measures were aimed to bring a better
competition atmosphere in domestic
market and to encourage more efficient
private producers.
• To reduce entry barrier for new private
banks and to increase competitiveness
among financial institutions by abolish
ing credit ceilings, eliminating interest
rate controls and reducing subsidy and
directed credit program in 1990.
The impact of these deregulation series
were very impressive. It generated a very
strong response from the private sector as
indicated by the boom in private investment,
rapid growth in non-oil exports, employment,
labor productivity and output (Karseno. 1994).
Deregulation packages have created a
new dimension in Indonesian economy.
Structural transformation has emerged. The
change in sector contribution to GDP from
1971 to 1996 can be observed in the follow
ing table:
1971 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Non-Oil GDP 73 72 77 80 80 88 89 90 91 91
Agriculture 33 24 23 22 21 20 18 17 16 15
industry: 37 -46 45 46 47 47 46 46 47 47
Mining 24 18 15 16 12 10 9.4 9.2 9
Utilities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Manufacture g 11 16 19 20 22 22 23 24 25
Non-oil Mnf 6 8 11 15 16 18 19 20 21 22
Other 10 10 11 11 12 13 13 13 13
Services 30 30 32 32 32 34 35 37 37 38
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics, various issues
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To sum up, key words to describe Indo
nesian economic policies was continuity and
change. On one hand, there are several poli
cies which are characterized by high conti
nuity 1992; Abimanyu, 1988):
• balanced budget policy
• inflation control policy by controlling
money supply and limiting government
expenditures
• sound management policy on deflcit
balance of payment
• policy of financing the government ex
penditures by foreign debt (government
budget deficit).
On the other hand, there are also changes in
economic performance during the New Or
der, i.e. structural transformation and de
regulation.
Pre-crisis Macroeconomic Developments,
1990-96
Over-investment in the non-
tradable sector, a highly protected manufac
turing industry, particularly state-owned en
terprises, and a weak financial system are
the root's of Indonesia's present financial
crisis. The investment was founded by mas
sive capital inflows that lead to a widening
current account deficit and mounting exter
nal debt. Capital inflows increased almost
two and one-half times from 1990 to 1994,
reaching $14.7 billion. The annual net in
flow of capital averaged 3.9 percent of GDP
from 1990 to 1996. Over-investment in less
efficient project misallocated resources
away from enlarging the productivity capac
ity of the economy, which would have in
creased the ability to service debt and reduce
external liabilities. Moreover, over
investment caused other distortions, such as
asset overvaluation, particularly in the real
estate sector (Nasution, 1998).
The changing composition of capi
tal inflows significantly added to Indonesia's
vulnerability. The share of short-term bank
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borrowings and portfolio flows invested in
the stock market and in private sector in
struments expanded rapidly during the
1990s. In 1997 when local interest rate
surged and the Rupiah depreciated, the cost
of renewing or rolling over short-term, float
ing-rate dollar and yen loans in real terms
skyrocketed. To some extent, the authorities
controlled the size and composition of vola
tile short-term capital inflows by imposing
ceilings and raising their cost {Nasution,
1998).
The financial liberalization policy
and advance in technology and information
processing had made it easier for Indone
sians to denominate deposits in foreign cur
rencies. A large proportion of foreign cur
rency denominated debt makes it difficult to
manage the macro-economy as well as bank
portfolios {Calvo.1994: Mishkin,1997). Ma
turity mismatched happened when banks use
short-term foreign currency dominated bor
rowing in the inter-bank market to fiind
longer-term bank loans.
Indonesia's financial system, par
ticularly the banking system, is plainly dys
functional because of the rotten central bank
and direct government intervention in selec
tion of bank credit customers. Private sector
banks are also involved in moral hazard be
havior, as they do not exert on discipline on
affiliate companies. Rebuilding the system
requires measures on strengthen boA the
central bank and commercial banks. State-
owned banks (and state-owned non-bank en
terprises) need to be de-linked from the gov-
emment bureaucracy and corporatized. In
addition, market infi^tmcture needs to be
improved to enforce the implementation of
prudential rules and regulations, to promote
competition, and to encourage strict credit
policies (Nasution, 1998). Beside that most
of East Asian financial systems suffer sev
eral critical weaknesses as a result of the
dominance of banking. They are not suffi-
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ciently flexible to cope with rapid and wide
fluctuations of asset prices and economic
conditions, particularly in more advanced
economies, because of their dependence on
debt. When businesses are mainly obligated
to creditors, rather then equity holders, they
are less able to withstand fluctuation in asset
prices and economic conditions(Masuyama,
1998).
WHAT EXPLAIN THE FAILURE OF
INDONESIAN ECONOMY
Highly dependent on Foreign Debt
In the process of modernization, ce-
teris paribus, the economic mechanism of
the Harrod-Domar growth model has sug
gested that the mobilization ofdomestic sav
ings and inflows of foreign capital are
needed to generate investment sufficient
enough to accelerate the process of mod
ernization. However, most of the LDCs suf
fer either from a shortage of capital and/or a •
shortage of foreign exchange, as represented
in the well-known two-gap model {Kindle-
berger and Herrick, 1977,pp. 296-298).
To make up for such shortages, many
LDCs (such as Indonesia) have adopted an
outward-looking development policy that
encourages free trade and free movement of
capital thus utilizing foreign resources in or
der to pave the way for rapid economic
growth. However, foreign capital inflows
have often given the impression that the
LDCs are economically dependent upon the
developed countries. Indonesia's modemiza-
tion drive depended on foreign capital in
flows likes other LDC country in the world.
The Indonesian economic development
from 1966 to 1997, has shows a dynamic
movement. The "engine" of economic
growth has been changing from one step of
economic development period to another
step of development, before finally appear at
the period ofeconomic crisis.
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• Period 1966 - 1971, the U' economic
recovery during "New Order Era",
funded by IMF loan.
• Period 1972 - 1983, economic devel
opment were supported by the oil bo
nanza, while keeping the government
budget deficit.
0 Period 1983 - 1986, government budget
deficit accompanying by fiscal and
monetary policy reforms; rupiah were
devaluated, major cutback in govern
ment real capital spending and mone
tary control, while retain civil servant
employment and salaries.
• Period 1986- 1993, government budget
deficit accompanying by deregulation
series and major industrial and ^nancial
reform. In 1986, rupiah were again de
valuated and major reform in banking
industry was started in 1988. Opening
up stock market for foreign player.
• Period 1993 - now, continues deregula
tion by opening up the national econ
omy even further; allowing small scale
capital inflow into the economy.
• Period 1997 - now, the economic crisis
and 2"*^ economic recovery, funded by
IMF loan.
Short run Capital inflow
Perceived as a stable country and one of
Asia's success stories Indonesia experienced
a surge in capital inflow in the 1990s. For
eign capital was attracted as a result of
wide-ranging market reforms undertaken in
1986 (see appendices). Demand for securi
ties of both state-owned and private Indone
sian company increase as a reforms allowed
foreigners to own up to 49 per cent of the
shares issued by listed domestic company
(except banks). Reforms also allow domestic
company to raise funds by selling securities
in local and international stock markets.
Capital inflows increase almost two and
one-half times from 1990 to 1994, reaching
JER Vol 6. No. 2.2001
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$14.7 billion. The annual net inflow of capi
tal averaged 3.9 percent of GDP from 1990
to 1996 {Nasution, 1998).
Capital inflows may be induced by wid
ening deferential between domestic and for
eign interest rate, due to an increase in do
mestic economic activity or monetary tight
ening and also because of rising income lev
els in East Asia due to high rates of eco
nomic growth contributed to the propensity
to save {Masuyama, 1998), and they may
arise, without any initial change in domestic
interest rate, from an increase in the ex
pected return on domestic capital investment
relative to return offshore. It seems that both
factors were behind the recent surge in capi
tal flows to Indonesia {Djiwandono, 1996a).
Although both sources of capital inflows
have the same consequences for domestic
monetary condition in the short run, in the
long run, only capital inflows induced by a
higher expected rate of return stimulate
growth in domestic demand, output, and
capital stock.
Rising capital inflow during the 1990s
have allowed Indonesia to grow faster but
they also have complicated macroeconomic
management. While capital inflows improve
balance of payments, they can also generate
inflationary pressure (thus interest rate
movement), real exchange rate appreciation,
and a deterioration in current account. Mas
sive capital inflows may contribute to specu
lative bubbles in stock and property markets
and leads to excessive expansion in domes
tic credit and threaten financial stability.
These problems are likely to intensify if a
significant portion of inflows is short term,
as the probability of an abrupt and sudden
reversal in these flow increase. {Rosul,
1998).
The massive capital inflows have oc
curred between 1990 to 1994, resulted in
over investment, particularly in non-tradable
sector. This massive capital inflows and
over investment situation have created over
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valuation in the asset pricing, especially in
real estate and infrastructure projects. The
rise of capital inflow in the private sector
has drove the equity price up. The excess of
liquidity in the money market has driven the
price of non-tradable asset increase. Infla
tion accelerated from 5.97 percent in 1989 to
an average of around 9.50 percent in 1990-
91. Government policies slowed inflation to
4.94 percent in 1992, but with large capital
inflows over the next three years the average
rate of inflation returned to levels about 9
percent for 1993-95. The increase in domes
tic demand stimulated by these large capital
inflows also widened the current account
deficit from US$1.28 billion in 1989 to
about US$7.80 billion in 1996. Monetary
tightening to control inflation using tradi
tional instruments such as open market op
erations was made less effective because it
was counteracted by capital inflows.
Most of the private debt was short-term
loan and borrowed directly from foreign
lenders. These, in turn, created complicated
financial problem for the firm when the debt
due. In the macroeconomic perspectives,
these issue created surge on the current ac
count balance of the country.
CONCLUDING REMARK
During New Order Era, Indonesian
people have been experiencing a relatively
comprehensive game of roller coaster type
of economy. The economies have been
changed dramatically for the last 25-year.
Even one year before the crisis, Indonesian
economic has been considered as the new
incoming industrial nation in Asia. How
ever, many economists seem to underesti
mate the role of structural and institutional
weaknesses behind the success of Indone
sian economy. The success of Indonesian
economic has been the result of economic
strategy that emphasized export orientation,
central coordination of production activities
and implicit (or even explicit) government
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guarantees of private investment project, as second half of 1997 gave credence to panic
well as intimate relationship between bank interpretation of the crisis. The sudden dis-
and firms. In addition of that, the financial covering of Indonesian institutional and
sectors also exhibiting significant problems structural weaknesses of Indonesian eco-
(ADB, 1999)..^ Weak prudential regulation, nomic has created the vulnerability to
lack and inexperienced supervision, low shocks.
capital adequacy ratio, lack of incentives- Indonesia and Asian economic crisis
compatible deposit insurance schemes, and have gives us an important lesson on an
distorted incentives for project selection all open economic policy. The open economic
rendered the national financial system - policy along with open national financial
weaker than they appeared. system would risking the national economy
With all we^esses on the financial if the policy not followed by enough domes-
regulation and financial institutions, the tic financial regulation and institution,
sudden international mass capital fled in the
•is paper Issponsored by the Norwegian Government through the collaboration between AgderUniversity College
in.Kristiansand, Norway and Gadjah Mada University inYogyakarta, Indonesia.
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TABLE & FIGURE
Table-2
Indonesia: Chronologyof majoreconomic events, 1965'1982
Year and Month Event
1965
December
"New" rupiah introduced, equivalent to 1,000 "old" rupiah; petroleum prices increased
250-fold: Indonesia ceased to meetforeign exchangecommitments
1966
March Soeharto assumes formal executive authority
April Indonesia appliesfor readmission to United Nations
June Arrival of Intemational Monetary Fund mission
September Firstmajor meeting with non-communist creditors, inTokyo
October
December
- Major stabilization and rehabilitation programme announced; import licensing sys
tempartially dismantled; "export bonus"
- Scheme liberalized
- Furthermeeting with creditors, in Paris
1967
January New Foreign Investment Law announced
February Firstofficial meeting of IGGI inThe Hague
July Major foreign exchangeliberalization
August Banking crisis
September Widespread riceshortages reported
November Newmining lawenacted
December ' Major reorganization ofstate enterprises; newbanking lawintroduced
1988
April Large increasesinpricesofpetroleum products and utilities
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May Major overhaul of'export bonus" scheme
September Positive rates on bankdeposits Instituted
November Dorhestic Investment law introduced
December Eight commercial banks established
1969
April
May
September
December
Repelita 1commences; startoffinancial yearshifted from 1January to 1April
Further reo^anization ofstate enterprises
EkonomI dan Keuangan (Indonesia's main economics journal) resumes publication
Inflation effectively brought under conffol (17 percent for theyear)
1970
April
Major trade policy package; devaluation, elimination ofmost multiple exchange rates,
simplification ofexport and import procedures' elimination of international capital con
trols;import bans on commercial vehiclesand second-hand automobiles introduced
May
December
- Bimas Gotong Royong discontinued, replaced with Bimas Nasional andInmas
• Final andcomplete unification oftheexchange rate
1971
April
August
September
- Import banon CBU automobiles imposed for Java andSumatra
-10 percentdevaluation ofrupiah now pegged toUS$
- Import dutieson 459 Items reduced
1972
December
Serious rice shortage evident; rice prices doubled August-December
1973
August
September
November
International petroleum prices begin torise steeply, quardrupling In next six months
The Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) established
Preferential treatment by statebanks for small pribumi borrowers announced
1974
January
Malari protes occur; imporat ban extended to all CBU vehicles; state bank medium-
term credits henceforth available only tofirms vwth significant pribumi-pribumi partners
strongly encouraged, local equity to exceed 50 percentwitiiln 10years, more sectors
closed toforeign investors (the regime was tightened furttier in March, July and Sep
tember)
March Regional development strategy announced, including establishment of Bappedas;
state enterprises transferred from the Department of Finance to "technicar depart-
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ments
April
Repelita II commences; anti-inflation package announced, including increased interest
rates andceilings on (state)commercial bankcredit
1975
February
Pertaminaunableto repay or refinanceItsshort-termdebt
April
Major shift In sugarstrategy announced, encouraging small holder production
May
Bank Indonesia ceased publication ofits weekly and monthly Bulletin (resumed Sep
July tember, 1976)
Soeharto andtheJapanese Prime Minister sign theAsahan Agreement
October
Imports of 23 varietiesof textiles banned
1976
February
First ASEAN Summitheld, in Bali
March
President Directorof Pertamina, IbnuSutowo, 'dismissed with honour"
April
Export promotion packageIntroduced, mostexport taxes reduced to 5 percent
August
Regulations relating to 'thirdgeneration'mining contracts announced -
1977
February
Investment licensing regime becomes more transparent, vrith first official release by
BKPM ofInvestment Priority List (DSP); petroleum Investment incentive packages be
come more attractive
June
Government announces stepped-up anti-corruption campaign
August
Jakarta Stock Exchange re-opened; tirst major LNG shipment, from Bontang (East
Kalimantan) to Japan
1978
January
Deposit ratesreduced, and banks reserve requirements cutfrom 30to 15percent
August
Small holder development programme introduced, including Nucleus Estates Scheme
and several crop-specific initiatives
November
50 percentdevaluation ofthe rupiah; extensive price controls introduced
1979
January
Export Certificate (Sertifikat Ekspor) scheme introduced, as an incentive toexporters
April
New tax package introduced, affecting company, sales and excise taxes, and tari^;
Repelita III commences
September
Second round oflarge increases ininternational petroleum prices commences
October
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Stage1ofPTKrakatau Steelstarts production
1980
March
Presidential Decree 14A favours pribumi ingovernment procurements
May
Ban on log exports announced, to be introduced in several phases; 50 per cent in
crease indomesticpetroleum prices
July
Indonesia's first textile tradedispute, with the United Kingdom
1981
November
Automotive industry plan envisages full local contentby1985
1982
January
Domestic petroleum prices increased by60 percent, halving thebudgeted oil subsidy;
new trade promotion package announced, including counter purchase and export
March credits
November Emergency OPEC meeting agrees to production cutbacks
Import licensing in the form of approved importer system (Tata Niaga Import) com
mences;sharp increase indeparture tax, from Rp.25,000 to Rp. 150,000.
Sources: Firdausy, Caninia Mulya, 1995: 'The Development experience of Indonesia; Lessons Forthe Econo
miesinTransition in Indo-China" inMacroeconomic Reform in Indo-China, UN-ESCAP, NewYork, pp 13-16.
Exchange rate
Fiscal Policy
Monetary and Financial
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Table-3
POLICY REFORMS, 1983/84-1993/94
Rupiah devaluated by28%in March 1983
Exchange rale mademoreflexible, since March 1983
Rupiah devaluedby31%in September 1986
Regional exchange ratehas depreciated againsta falling US Dollar since
September 1986, preventing appreciation ofrealeffective exchangerate.
Large capital and import intensive projects rephased inMay 1983
Major cutback ingovernment realcapital spending since1983
Tight control maintained since1983on the use ofnon-concessional import
related credits.
Amajor taxreform initiated, starting inJanuary1984
Foilow-up steps taken to strengthen tax administration
Restrainson civil service employment and salaries
A major financial reform initiated in june 1983,involving removal of interest
rate and credit ceilings for state bankoperations and introduction of newin
strumentsof monetarycontrol.
A new set of financial measures introduced in October and December 1988,
aimed at enhancing financial sector efficiency and developing capital mar
kets.
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Trade Policy
-Y
Other Regulatory reforms
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Improved monetary management to control inflation,
Improved shorttermmonetary management to cu^ exchange rate specula
tion.
Reduction indirected, subsidized credits starting in1990
Intense efforts to improve supervision offinancial system, including restruc
turing capital market regulations (1990)
Adopted newcapital adequacy and provision standards inFebruary 1991.
Relaxation of prudential standards introduced in May 29, 1993 and the
deadline to meet the CAR of 8% was extended to December 1994.
Anacross the boardreduction in nominal tariffs implemented in March 1985
Measures to provide internationally-priced inputs to exporters announced
on May 6,1986
Significant reduction in import licensing restrictions outfitted through a se
ries of measures in October 1986, January and December 1987 and No
vember 1988.
Steps taken in December 1987 to reduce theanti - export bias oftrade pbl-
icy
byreducing regulatory restrictions for exporters.
Anacross-the-board reduction in most nominal tariffs to a ceiling of 40%in
May 1990.The package also a further easing of NTBs.
Another major removal NIB, covering simplification of licencing procedures
in trade, manufacturing, health, and agricultural business, July1992and
October 1993.
Replacement import ban built up passenger car with prohibitive 300% tariff
rate, further reduction in tariff for other commodities, and relaxation of regu
lations intrade inagriculture products,June 1993.
Reorganization of customs, ports and shipping operations in April 1985to
reducefreight costs and sut processing time.
Steps taken through the May 1986, October 1986, January 1987 and De
cember 1987 packages to reduce the investmentand capacity licensing re
quirements, relax foreign investment regulations, and reduce the role of lo
cal content program.
Substantial deregulation of maritime activities arinounced in November
1988to reduce costs and encourage privatesector participation.
, Replacements of restrictive positive listof areas open for investment with
shortnegative listin1989.
Initial steps towardsPublicEnterprisereform.
Deregulation extended to pharmaceutical and some agricultural activities in
the May 1990package.
Reduction the number of investment negative lists from 51 to 34, June 10,
1993
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Table4
Indonesia Balance of Payment (1992-1997)
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Balance of payment(USS mn)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Current account
-3,112 -2,296
-3,094 -7,023 -6,987 -8,069
as % of GDP 2.5 1.6 1.8 3.7 3.3 3
Export 33,796 36,607 40,060 45,418 47,754 52,038
import
-26,774 -28,090 -31,880 -40,629 41,502 45,819
Trade Balance 7,022 8,517 8,180 4,789 6,252 6,219
invisibles
-10,144 -10,529 -11,274 -12,489 -13,239 -14,288
Capital Account 6,471 5,962 4,008 9,387 11,463 12,668
Total 3,349 3,950 914 1,687 -4,476 4,599
Errors and omissions
-1,606 -3,209 -108 -1,113 -1,825 -701
Reserves
-1,743 -741 •806 -574 -2,651 -3,898
10,(XX)
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2,000
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Figure-1
Balance ofPayment 1992-1997
• Current account
•Trade Balance
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Table-5
Indonesia: Growthof Investmentapproval, 1967'1994
Year Domestic Investement Foreign Investment
Project Value (Rp. bn) Project Value ($. mn)
1967 12 207.1
1968 26 38 35 264.4
1969 73 33 37 127.5
1970 176 112.6 83 166.8
1971 214 185.9 62 287.2
1972 268 185.9 47 163
1973 299' , 469.3 69 323.8
1974 134 , 170.2 53 542.4
1975 78 158.5 24 1145
1976 75 22.4 22 221
1977 155 483.6 20 167
1978 188 678.8 23 ' 207.1
1979 166 654.8 13 248.6
1980 159 2817.3 20 1074.4
1981 164 2291.8 24 706.5
1982 205 3616 31 2416.9
1983 333 , 6476 46 2470.8
1984 145 2109 23 1096.9
1985 245 3736.2 45 853.2
1986 315 4411.5 93 847.6
1987 570 10449.6 130 1520.3
1988 843 14201.8 145 4410.7
1989 863 19593.8 294 4713.5
1990 1324 56510.5 432 8751.1
1991 804 41077.9 376 8778
1992 436 29341.7 305 10323.2.
1993 548 39450.4 , 329 8144.2
1994 314 22750.7 . 131 5019.4
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Figure-2
Approved Investment (Domestic andforeign) 1967 -1994
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TableG
Indicatorsof External Stability, 1990-1996
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Rp.billion
US $. million
1990 1991 .1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Currentaccount Balance, % GDP -2.8 -3.7 -2.2 -1.6 -1.7 -3.7 -4.0
NetCapital Inflows, % GDP 4.9 5.0 3.6 1.9 2.4 4.6 5.0
Portfolio Investment -0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.1 2.2 2.0
Direct Investment 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2
Other 3.3 3.6 3.5 1.4 -0.9 •0.9
External Reserves, most of imports 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.0 4.4 5.1
M2/Reserves, % 514.0 505.7 497.4 557.1 602.9 657.4 633.3
External Debt/Exsports, % 222.0 236.9 221.8 11.9 195.8 205.0 194.0
Short-term Debt/External Debt, % 15.9 7.9 20.5 20.11.0 17.7 20.9 24.8
Short-termDebt. US$ billions 11.1 14.3 18.1 118.0 17.1 24.3 29.3
Debt-Sen/lce/ Export % 30.9 32.0 31.6 33.8 30.0 33.7 33.0
Exports/ GDP, % 26.6 27.4 29.4 25.9 26.0 26.0 26.2
Exports Growth, % 15.9 13.5 16.6 8.4 8.8 13.4 9.7
Priceof oil, US$/barrel 28.64 20.06 18.71 14.14 16.11 18.02 22.78
Sumber: IMF, Intemational FinancialStatistics
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Figure-3
Current Account Balance, % GDP
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Tabel7: FDI Project by Sector 1991-1998 (Million US$)
Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998* Growth 97-98
Agriculture and fisheries 160.1 729.8 1384.2 1251.6 463.7 790.3 70.43
Mining 0 0 0 1696.8 1.6 0.3 -81.25
Manufacturing 3422.8 22367.8 26892.1 16072.1 23017.3 4728 -79.46
Eieclricity, Gas and Water 2275.6 2397.3 3549.3 3805.5 1839.9 1607.4 -12.64
Construc^on 96.9 76.5 205.8 296.8 306.8 155.8 -49.22
Trade, restorants and hotels 1087.5 • 430.3 1029.3 1761.7 472 421.3 -10.74
Transport and comunication 85.4 145.1 5539.5 694.6 5900 70.5 -98.81
Finance and insurance 598 1027.8 1222 3000.3 1397.6 787.6 -43.65
Other Services 417.9 178.7 122.5 1076.2 433.6 118.9 -72.58
Total 10137.2 29347.3 41939.7 31651.6 35829.5 8680.1 -75.77
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Figure 9: FDI and Domestic Investment 1967-1997
Domestic Rp Billion
FDI-Total US$ Million
FDI-Export US$ Milin
1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997
168 JER Vol 6. No. 2.2001
ISSN: 1410-2641
80 000 000
70 000 000
60 000 000
50 000 000
40 000 000
30 000 000
20 000 000
10 000 000
Arief Ramelan Karseno, Review onGovernmentpolicies andtheEconomic,
Figure10 : CostofLaborrelatedtoFDI from 1967-1997
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